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Abstract 
 
It has been long emphasized that companies must interpret the environment they oper-
ate in and develop an understanding of what it signifies for future action. Today, it is 
typical for companies to deploy specialized intelligence teams with the purpose of scan-
ning information from the environment to serve as a basis for interpretation and deci-
sion making. 
 
This thesis provides evidence that the role of intelligence teams can go beyond what has 
been previously suggested. Firstly, the teams are able to evaluate the consistency be-
tween the environment and the beliefs held of the environment in the organization, and 
secondly, the teams direct organizational attention to the inconsistencies they observe 
and subsequently facilitate change in beliefs through the use of concrete evidence. In-
telligence teams can, therefore, operate as update mechanisms and revise unsound be-
liefs of the environment. 
 
Moreover, these findings shed light on the processes that regulate beliefs in organiza-
tions and beliefs concerning the environment in particular. Furthermore, the organiza-
tional conditions surrounding the teams are described and factors that either support 
or complicate the teams’ actions are identified. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Yritysten pitää seurata ja tulkita toimintaympäristöään ja ymmärtää mitä tuo ympäristö 
tarkoittaa niiden toiminnan kannalta. Voidakseen tulkita ympäristöään ja tehdä 
päätöksiä niiden täytyy ensin kerätä tietoa, ja nykyään on tavallista, että yritykset 
hyödyntävät tiedonkeruuseen erikoistuneita yksiköitä. 
 
Tässä työssä esitetään, että tiedonkeruutiimeillä voi olla merkittävämpi rooli kuin 
aikaisemmin on ajateltu. Tiimeillä on kyky huomata, milloin organisaatiossa on 
uskomuksia, jotka ovat ristiriidassa ympäristön kanssa. Tiimit ohjaavat organisaation 
huomion näihin seikkoihin ja edesauttavat muutosta uskomuksissa esittämällä 
todistusaineistoa. Näin niiden voidaan ajatella toimivan päivitysmekanismeina ja 
auttavan organisaatioita ylläpitämään tarkan käsityksen ympäristöstä. 
 
Tämä löydös on myös esimerkki siitä, miten organisaatioiden sisäiset prosessit 
muokkaavat uskomuksia. Lisäksi työssä käsitellään olosuhteita, kuten kulttuuria ja 
toimintatapoja, joiden vaikutuksen alla tiimit työskentelevät ja jotka edesauttavat tai 
vaikeuttavat tiimien toimintaa. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Understanding their external environments is imperative to all businesses. They 
face today a volatile world where environmental changes occur at a higher fre-
quency and at a greater magnitude than ever before. Maintaining an accurate 
and meaningful perception of their environments allows businesses to judge 
what they should do next, and adapt to the changes they confront. In order to 
develop a conception of the environment, they must collect information from a 
variety of sources. There is, however, an abundancy of information and busi-
nesses must be selective in what information they gather. Managers are bom-
barded with more information than they can ever handle, and many companies 
deploy specialized intelligence teams with the focus of collecting and digesting 
information for managers to incorporate in their decision making. In other words, 
these groups produce intelligence – information that can be applied to direct the 
future actions of the company. 
 
The role of intelligence teams as a unit responsible of disseminating information 
to managers introduces specific challenges, especially when it comes to detect-
ing and communicating changes in the environment that present novelty to the 
organization. Generally speaking, the unexplored potential of new knowledge 
makes it inherently attractive, but it is also susceptible to doubt, since its ap-
plicability is yet to be confirmed, and establishing the relevance of new 
knowledge is the main concern of anyone who wishes to communicate it to oth-
ers (Schulz, 2001). 
 
One of the challenges of communicating new knowledge is individuals’ propen-
sity to judge relevance on sentiment and belief rather than rationality (Nag & 
Gioia, 2012). Furthermore, communicating personal inferences is usually not 
accompanied by exhaustive presentation of the actual evidence that they are 
drawn from. The recipients of such inferences, therefore, are incapable of veri-
fying them on their own and must repose trust in the person who has made the 
inferences in order to accept them. (Hammond, 1994) Hence, intelligence 
teams should not only be able to judge and communicate the relevance of new 
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knowledge but should also have management’s confidence on their side in or-
der to achieve it. 
 
Previous literature (Ghoshal & Westney, 1991; Gilad, 1989; Lenz & Engledow, 
1986; Stubbart, 1982) has raised concern of the efficacy of intelligence opera-
tions, citing a lack of organizational influence and unclear impact in decision 
making processes. Gilad (1989), for example, reminds that managers gather 
intelligence by themselves in an informal fashion, and that this activity is a direct 
rival of intelligence teams in companies’ internal exchange of information. He 
argues that the purpose of intelligence teams is not to replace individual man-
agers’ scanning efforts, but to complement them. He does recognize that this is 
no straightforward task, since managers tend to rely on their own information 
sources, and continues to argue that teams willing to achieve this objective will 
have to prove themselves useful by looking at unorthodox sources and estab-
lish close communication ties that allow them both to understand managerial 
needs and to deliver their viewpoints effectively.  
 
Stubbart (1982) has stated that such teams are hopelessly out of touch with the 
reality of the businesses they intend to service and that they can hardly contrib-
ute anything meaningful from a managerial point of view. He does, however, 
maintain that the fundamental goal of the teams is worthy of pursuing, and im-
plies that the shortcomings can be attributable to organizational designs that fail 
to address the teams’ needs, and calls for further investigation of the conditions 
that would allow the teams to operate more effectively. Organizational design 
does, after all, greatly affect what information will reach managers (Hammond, 
1994). Lauzen (1995, p. 199) concurs with these views and states that isolated 
departments operating in disconnection of the everyday conduct of business are 
“poorly equipped to translate data into intelligence”. 
 
The findings of Ghoshal and Westney (1991) on competitive intelligence units, 
scanning units that specifically focus on gathering intelligence on competitors, 
support these concerns outlined above. They interviewed the intelligence units 
and the units’ clients, managers who would make use of the intelligence pro-
duced by the units, at three large US companies. The study found that the most 
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common problems identified by the intelligence units can be labeled as “mana-
gerial culture”, while the most common problems identified by managers could 
be described as a “lack of relevance of outputs to action” (1991, p. 20). These 
findings highlight the complicated relationship between intelligence units and 
management and the difficulty of organizing a team that would deliver meaning-
ful intelligence. 
 
Since the fundamental purpose of intelligence teams is to convey information 
and knowledge of the external environment to managers, it is important to un-
derstand the relationship between these two parties. However, this relationship 
as it unfolds in everyday co-operation and interaction has not garnered much 
attention in research. The objective of this thesis is to explore modern intelli-
gence teams in regard to these human processes.  
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 The premises of information gathering 
 
During the 20th century, Western societies gradually shifted from an industrial 
age dominated by capital – the assets used to produce goods and to finance 
enterprise – to a post-capitalist age where knowledge and information are the 
crucial resources for economic activity. Telecommunications, information tech-
nology and health care are all industries that have taken central roles in modern 
economies by having their businesses centered on the application of 
knowledge. Meanwhile, traditional industries that have continued to prosper 
have done so because they have managed to rethink themselves. The steel 
industry, for example, found new success after organizing itself on new produc-
tion principles and the banking industry transformed into selling information in 
addition to collecting interest. (Drucker, 1993) 
 
A fundamental change in how we think of companies coincided with the shift 
described above. Scholars of the early 20th century expected them to maximize 
their economic benefit through rational decisions based on perfect information 
(Rosen, 1997). Furthermore, early theories implied that information is somehow 
readily at their disposal (Cyert & March, 1963). These attributes suggested that 
companies are in possession of complete knowledge and make decisions by 
computing an optimal course of action whenever they need.  
 
Later research has focused on the actual processes inside companies, and hu-
man cognition and behavior were found instrumental to decision making. A core 
idea behind these traits is called bounded rationality, which refers to the limited 
capacity of the human mind. In contrast to early beliefs, it was established that 
companies are not able to predict the consequences of their decisions accurate-
ly, and knowledge of the circumstances in which decisions are made does not 
flow to them automatically and in full detail. In fact, companies have to search 
for information by themselves and get by with an incomplete understanding of 
the world. (Gavetti, Greve, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2012) 
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Information technology and the Internet enable information to move so rapidly 
and so comprehensively that events spread and trigger reactions almost instan-
taneously anywhere in the world. Furthermore, people and products are more 
mobile than ever, any type of repetitive work is at risk of being automated and 
whole industries can be reorganized in global structuring. These conditions 
make an environment prone to change at an unprecedented scale. (Webster, 
2005) The ability to adapt to external environments is crucial to the survival of 
all companies (Hambrick, 1982) and the increasing pace of change that compa-
nies have experienced in their environments has only highlighted the fact 
(Choudhury & Sampler, 1997; Lauzen, 1995). 
 
Companies are dependent on their external environment in many ways, and the 
environment is considered to be one of the most important factors that influence 
organizational attributes including structure, internal processes and decision 
making. Research suggests that companies tend to create a fit between them-
selves and the characteristics of the environment. (Daft, Sormunen, & Parks, 
1988) They can align their capabilities with the environment and achieve a dy-
namic balance, where change in the environment is met with their companies’ 
ability to change. To achieve such a balance is the task of companies’ strategy. 
(Porter, 1991) 
 
Companies do formulate strategies in the plans they intend to carry out, but 
these plans might never be realized for a variety of reasons. Unexpected 
changes or misjudgments, for example, can render them useless in practice. 
However, companies must take actions in their struggle for survival, and a com-
pany can be thought to display a strategy in the thread of consistency that con-
nects one decision to another, be it a result of conscious planning or decisions 
made on the spot when circumstances so demand. Mintzberg (1978, p. 934) 
summarizes this idea when he describes strategy as a “pattern in a stream of 
decisions”. (Mintzberg, 1978)  The underlying logic that explains these patterns 
is determined by cognitive frameworks that embody the knowledge and experi-
ence managers have accumulated of the business environment (Narayanan, 
Zane, & Kemmerer, 2011).  
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According to Mintzberg (1978), managers’ task is to mediate between two forc-
es: the way their company exists and operates now, and the external environ-
ment that introduces change at an unpredictable rate. The challenge is to 
achieve a sense of stability and order inside the company but still maintain a 
readiness for change at the same time. A company typically establishes itself 
through a consistent behavior for a certain period of time, only to be forced to 
adapt to a change in the environment.  This is called a point of strategic change, 
when the consistency that the company has displayed in the past has to be 
changed in response to a shift in the environment. However, a company can 
create a response to a change only if it acquires information of it first (Hambrick, 
1982). Research suggests that incorporating information of changes in the envi-
ronment into strategic decision making contributes to companies’ survival in the 
long-term (Lenz & Engledow, 1986). 
 
2.2 Scanning and interpretation 
 
There is no universal description of the environment, but one useful generaliza-
tion is to think of it as all the factors outside the company that concern decision 
making. The environment is typically thought to consist of two layers, which 
both can be further divided into various sectors. The first environmental layer is 
called the task environment, and it consists of sectors that the company has 
direct contacts with, such as their customers, suppliers and competitors. The 
second layer is called the general environment, which is thought to affect the 
company indirectly, and includes the economic, political and social sectors. 
(Elenkov, 1997) The placement of these sectors into the two environmental lay-
ers may differ between industries. For example, the banking industry could in-
clude the regulatory sector into the task environment due to a tight relationship 
with governmental agencies. (Daft et al., 1988) 
 
Companies engage in scanning, which is the process of collecting data from the 
environment for managers (Daft & Weick, 1984). This scanning is a prerequisite 
for interpreting the environment, which in turn is a central issue when construct-
ing a strategy for the future (Nag & Gioia, 2012). The objective of scanning is to 
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help managers reduce the uncertainty they experience when they cannot un-
derstand the environment or assess future events (Elenkov, 1997). In effect, 
this uncertainty prevents them from identifying opportunities and problems in 
the environment and makes the company vulnerable (Daft et al., 1988). Failure 
in detecting changes in the environment and responding to them may lead to a 
decrease in organizational performance (Elenkov, 1997). 
 
According to Daft et al. (1988), scanning activities are initiated in sectors that 
pose strategic uncertainty, and scanning efforts are typically not distributed 
equally across all environmental sectors. A sector is perceived uncertain when 
the company thinks it does not have sufficient information to guide its actions 
(Elenkov, 1997). Perceived uncertainty is influenced by the complexity of the 
environment and the rate at which the environment changes. Complex envi-
ronments display a large number of diverse events and are therefore difficult to 
grasp, and a high rate of change results in rapid shifts in events and makes ac-
curate information difficult to obtain. Perceived uncertainty alone isn’t enough to 
draw attention towards an environmental sector, managers must also consider 
the sector important to the attainment of organizational goals. The most im-
portant sectors are thought to affect companies’ operation and performance 
directly. (Daft et al., 1988) 
 
From a managerial point of view, information is acquired through personal or 
impersonal sources. Personal sources refer to direct human contact in the form 
of conversation, whereas impersonal include a variety of written documenta-
tions, like reports, memos and managerial information systems. Personal 
sources convey rich content and subtleties, many of which are difficult to articu-
late in written form and emerge more easily through dialog. Furthermore, con-
versation enables immediate feedback and is especially effective in facilitating 
understanding. Impersonal sources have the advantage of providing tangible 
references on external events, and are used for systematic and periodic report-
ing. (Daft et al., 1988) 
 
Another distinction is made in whether the information originates internally or 
externally to the company. Internal information sources include all the documen-
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tation and discussions with other managers and employees concerning the en-
vironment. Of course, the actual information concerns the external environment, 
but internal information pertains to such information that is specifically pro-
cessed and delivered to managers by some part of the company itself. External 
information sources exist outside the boundaries of the company and commonly 
refer to peers in other companies, information services and news. This infor-
mation reaches the manager directly, and unlike internal information, is consid-
ered free of distortion that processing inside the company produces (Daft et al., 
1988) 
 
Daft et al. (1988) have found that strategic uncertainty affects both the frequen-
cy at which environmental sectors are scanned and the sources through which 
chief executives gather information. An increase in the uncertainty of a sector 
results in an increase in scanning frequency, because information concerning 
the sector has become more valuable to the company. Consequently, the lim-
ited resources available to scanning are directed to sectors where uncertainty is 
perceived to be greatest. The increase in uncertainty is also followed by favor-
ing personal sources over impersonal ones. A plausible explanation for this is 
the difficulty of obtaining data under ambiguous circumstances. Furthermore, an 
interesting observation was that scanning frequency increased through internal 
and external sources at equal magnitudes, signaling no preference in either one 
in managers. 
 
Previous literature has also addressed the effect of organizational culture on 
environmental scanning behavior in companies. Qiu (2008), for example, con-
cluded that a culture of market orientation – a persistent effort of satisfying cus-
tomer needs above all else – leads to proactive scanning behavior in managers. 
Lauzen (1995) found that a participative culture characterized by collaboration 
and exchange of information is likely to be accompanied by formal environmen-
tal scanning procedures. She argues that such organizations value information, 
and that this appreciation is reflected in an institutionalized approach in scan-
ning, which manifests itself in meetings, written reports and focus groups. How-
ever, these studies only address the behavior of managers, not specialized in-
telligence teams. 
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Initially, everything a company can perceive in the environment is data (von 
Krogh, Roos, & Slocum, 1994); interpretation is “the process by which manag-
ers translate data into knowledge and understanding about the environment” 
(Daft & Weick, 1984, p. 291). How data is interpreted is determined by cognitive 
frameworks called schemas that enable us to make sense of incoming data and 
plan our actions in the environment. The foundation of these frameworks is in 
previously acquired knowledge and experience. (Nag & Gioia, 2012; Walsh, 
1995)  
 
Walsh (1995, p. 281) describes a schema as “a mental template that an individ-
ual imposes on an information environment to give it form and meaning… in a 
way that allows subsequent interpretation and action”. In a more general sense, 
these frameworks characterize our thinking when we encounter something new 
and judge what is important to us. Furthermore, being able to interpret data re-
quires knowledge that is capable of handling it, and it is not uncommon to leave 
data unprocessed due to a lack of knowledge. (von Krogh et al., 1994) 
 
Organizational interpretation is the process in which top managers develop a 
shared understanding of data. When this understanding is put to use in the con-
crete actions that the company takes, further data concerning the environment 
is created through feedback mechanisms which then feed new interpretation 
and action. Cycles likes this where the company makes use of its interpretation 
in new actions and then reflects the outcomes of those actions to further the 
understanding of the environment are called organizational learning. (Daft & 
Weick, 1984) Figure 1 below illustrates the relationship between the three con-
cepts of scanning, interpretation and learning. 
 
 
Figure 1 Scanning, interpretation and learning by Daft & Weick (1984) 
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Daft and Weick (1984) provide a general description of companies’ scanning 
and interpretation processes. They propose that the nature of these processes 
depends on two dimensions: (1) managers’ beliefs of how well the environment 
can be analyzed and (2) how extensively the company intrudes into the envi-
ronment. Managerial beliefs of the environment are a product of their own expe-
rience and the characteristics of the environment. Environments that managers 
think can be explained by breaking them down into concrete objects and rela-
tionships between them are perceived analyzable, whereas environments that 
are difficult to reach and subject to change and ambiguity are considered unan-
alyzable. The extent to which companies behave intrusively and explore the 
environment for new discoveries is higher in competitive and problematic envi-
ronments that pose threats and force a company to do so in order to survive. 
 
An assumption that the environment can be analyzed will typically lead to scan-
ning activities characterized by systematic information gathering, rationalizing 
and a general sense of alertness. In contrast, if the environment is thought to be 
unanalyzable, scanning will take an unsystematic approach and rely more on 
personal networks and subjective judgement. Companies that behave in an in-
trusive manner will engage in research and learn by trial and error. Passive 
companies that merely stand their ground will take the environment as it is, set-
tling for a role of an observer and capture whatever information happens to 
reach them. (Daft & Weick, 1984) 
 
These two dimensions can be combined to form four modes of interpretation a 
company can take. Companies that believe that their environment is analyzable 
but do not actively intrude into the environment engage in a mode called condi-
tioned viewing. The company believes that the environment can be understood 
objectively and it doesn’t pose threats. Passive behavior and a lack of threats 
have conditioned the company to the environment in the sense that it can rely 
on established procedures and routinely produced reports and documentation in 
its scanning activities. However, these procedures and routines have once been 
developed, but the company has found it satisfactory to rely on them alone, and 
it doesn’t see it necessary to expand its activities any further. Therefore, scan-
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ning activities are limited to existing practices and the interpretations the com-
pany makes tend to lie within familiar boundaries. (Daft & Weick, 1984) 
 
A company that simultaneously believes the environment is analyzable and ac-
tively intrudes into the environment engages in a mode called discovering. The 
underlying thinking of these companies is that the environment can be under-
stood through scrutiny, and there is a correct course of action to be figured out. 
In contrast to conditioned viewing, the company takes active measures to fur-
ther its understanding of the environment. It probes unanswered questions 
through market research and trend analyses in order to predict future outcomes 
and justify its interpretations. Formal reports are produced, not to meet periodic 
routines like in the case of conditioned viewing, but as a result of specialized 
inquiries.  (Daft & Weick, 1984) 
 
A third kind of company is one that intrudes into the environment but does not 
believe that the environment is analyzable; hence it has very few cues from the 
environment suggesting what to do but it has to keep itself active due to com-
petitive pressures or other threats. A company like this engages in an interpre-
tation mode called enacting and will take actions that it believes to produce re-
sults although there might not be concrete evidence to support the view. It is 
action oriented and relies on data that is produced through its own initiatives 
and collected by feedback mechanisms. It can, for example, introduce new 
products that it thinks will sell instead of focusing on products that have an ex-
isting demand in the market. These companies can shape their environment 
through their own actions rather than the other way round. They ignore conven-
tional views and expectations and test and experiment novel solutions in an en-
terprising fashion. (Daft & Weick, 1984)  
 
Finally, companies that don’t believe that the environment is analyzable nor in-
trude into the environment engage in undirected viewing. Similar to companies 
engaging in conditioned viewing, they are passive and do not have an urge for 
new discoveries, but the difference is in that they don’t rely on objective data 
because they believe such a thing doesn’t exist in an unanalyzable environ-
ment. Instead, they gather information through personal contacts without follow-
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ing any particular plan and gather information whenever the opportunity pre-
sents itself. Unlike conditioned viewing, they don’t rely on formal information 
systems and are more open to cues from varying sources. (Daft & Weick, 1984) 
Figure 2 below summarizes these four modes of interpretation and repeats the 
central characteristics of each of them. 
 
 
Figure 2 Modes of interpretation, modified from Daft & Weick (1984) 
 
It is important to note that these modes of interpretation are not one-time deci-
sions that the company takes. As described above, they depend on managers’ 
beliefs of how well the environment can be analyzed and the characteristics of 
the environment itself, both of which can change over time. However, manage-
rial beliefs can be persistent and they might not change without an organiza-
tional crisis or replacement of managers (Narayanan et al., 2011). 
 
The main tenet of Daft and Weick (1984, p. 285) is that companies must oper-
ate as interpretation systems and “find ways to know the environment”. Fur-
thermore, they place interpretation to the heart of organizational existence. In-
terpretation is the process that formulates meaning, and without meaning, they 
argue, an organization is void of purpose and direction and therefore cannot 
thrive. The meaning of things, after all, does not explain what they are in an ob-
jective sense, but what they signify for human behavior (Peterson, 1999). 
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The manner in which Daft and Weick (1984) describe organizations to operate 
as such systems does, however, introduce a dichotomy. They recognize that 
the organization as a whole does engage in scanning the environment and in 
relaying information towards management, but they assume that interpretation 
is the sole responsibility of management, and most importantly, the responsibil-
ity of top management – “a relatively small group at the top of the organizational 
hierarchy… the point at which information converges and is interpreted for or-
ganization level action” (1984, p. 285). 
 
While Daft and Weick’s (1984) propositions have greatly influenced later re-
search (Walsh, 1995), scholars have further developed the descriptions of how 
organizational interpretation occurs and have expanded the views of Daft and 
Weick in certain respects. Understanding interpretation as a process that takes 
place invariably at a single level of management, for example, is challenged. 
Furthermore, the simple claim that information would converge at the top level 
of management for organization-wide interpretation is an assumption that over-
simplifies organizational reality. Later research has pictured interpretation as a 
more collaborative effort that joins forces across organizational levels (Beck & 
Plowman, 2009) and has examined how information flows through organiza-
tional hierarchies and how this affects organizational action in greater detail 
(Joseph & Ocasio, 2012). 
 
2.3 Managerial cognition and decision making 
 
One way to think of interpretation is to imagine that it produces a cognitive rep-
resentation of the environment. The representation explains what the environ-
ment is and how it works. The way companies behave in respect to an envi-
ronment depends on the representation they have of it. Companies gather data 
from the environment that enables them to deduce a representation, which then 
determines how the company reacts to stimuli originating from the environment. 
(Narayanan et al., 2011) 
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Cognitive representations like this are called strategy frames and they comprise 
the general logic with which managers make decisions. Essentially, strategy 
frames are schemas of their own kind in the sense that they develop specifically 
on the knowledge and experience managers have acquired of the business en-
vironment. (Narayanan et al., 2011) Nadkarni and Barr (2008, p. 1398) describe 
managers’ cognitive representations as the result of “making sense of, learning 
from, and addressing the unique cognitive challenges in their operating envi-
ronments”. Learning through new experiences allows these interpretive sche-
mas to evolve into more accurate representations of the environment (von 
Krogh et al., 1994).  
 
However, it is quite possible for companies to operate on conceptions that re-
flect past environments instead of current ones (Nag & Gioia, 2012; von Krogh 
et al., 1994), and all companies should keep themselves attentive and chal-
lenge the way they think of the environment (Fahey & Narayanan, 1989). Walsh 
(1995) points out that while schemas allow managers to make sense of their 
environments, there is a danger of managers applying them in a dogmatic fash-
ion, thereby compromising their ability to detect and deal with changes they are 
unfamiliar with. Similarly, von Krogh, Roos and Slocum (1994, p. 58) state that 
“what you know determines what you see”. 
 
Schemas allow us to operate effectively in known territory, but the moment we 
find ourselves in unknown territory, they cease to help us and we are confronted 
by stimuli we are unable to understand and we can experience uneasiness and 
anxiety as a result (Peterson, 1999). Eisenhardt (1989) reminds that managers’ 
ability to act can be significantly impaired under uncertainty. She does, howev-
er, show that managers can benefit from working in concert with other execu-
tives that she calls counselors, experienced and knowledgeable individuals, 
who act as sounding boards for new ideas and as confidantes, helping manag-
ers deal with the adverse emotions involved in tense situations. 
 
The way these cognitive representations are put to use can follow two logics. 
Companies that believe the environment is analyzable will follow a deterministic 
logic, whereas companies that believe it to be unanalyzable will follow a proac-
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tive logic. A deterministic logic produces a behavioral pattern where the compa-
ny observes the environment and acts in response to external events. These 
companies can be called environment-driven, as their strategies are shaped by 
the environment. A proactive logic produces a pattern where the company tries 
to influence the environment in pursuit of a belief of what the environment could 
be. The company cannot work out a reasonable course of action based on cues 
from the environment, and chooses to impart meaning on the environment 
through its own actions instead. These companies try to shape the environment 
through their strategies and are called interpretation-driven. (Nadkarni & Barr, 
2008) 
 
Furthermore, an important trait is that typically some of a representation’s con-
stituents are more pronounced in managers’ thinking than others. This imbal-
ance is referred to as attention focus, and it occurs because managers confront 
more information of the environment than they have the capacity to handle, 
which in turn leads them to pay attention to areas they believe to be most rele-
vant, filtering out domains they deem unnecessary. This phenomenon explains 
what environmental events are taken into consideration and thought important 
enough to induce a response. (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) 
 
In addition, there are two underlying logics that explain what managers want to 
scan in the environment. Backward-looking scanning gathers data on matters 
that the company is familiar with; these matters are scanned because managers 
have established their importance through experience. Forward-looking scan-
ning chooses subjects for data gathering through reasoning. (Narayanan et al., 
2011) It focuses on matters managers find important because their understand-
ing of the environment leads them to that conclusion (Gavetti & Levinthal, 
2000).  
 
Figure 3 below illustrates these two logics of scanning. Both of them can be 
thought to originate in the same strategy frame although they reflect two differ-
ent aspects of it. Backward-looking scanning reflects how managers’ previous 
experience tells them what to look at. Forward-looking scanning reflects the 
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cognitive representation of the environment that enables them to judge what to 
look at. 
 
 
Figure 3 Backward- and forward-looking scanning 
 
Strategy frames can be thought to expand the previously discussed concepts of 
scanning, interpretation and learning. Firstly, they govern what the company 
chooses to scan either through backward- or forward-looking scanning. Second-
ly, the interpretation process is what forms the strategy frames themselves 
when a representation of the environment is constructed on acquired data. 
Thirdly, strategy frames explain the actions companies take and are the under-
lying reference frame in the learning process. Both scanning and learning feed 
new interpretations that add to the strategy frame. Figure 4 illustrates these 
concepts and the relationships between them. 
 
 
Figure 4 Strategy frames in respect to scanning, interpretation and learning 
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Due to bounded rationality, the cognitive representations that managers have 
developed of the environment are imperfect. They can be described as simpli-
fied models of the environment that enable managers to make reasonable deci-
sions within the capacity of their own minds. Managers are incapable of envi-
sioning all alternative courses of action available to the company and of com-
prehending the consequences these alternatives will have in the environment. 
(Gavetti & Levinthal, 2000) 
 
In short, cognitive representations can be described as a lens through which 
managers view the environment and the actions available to them, and it is im-
portant to highlight that decision making is affected by the representations and 
not the real environments they are thought to reflect. Their most important fea-
ture pertaining to decision making is how the causal relationship between the 
environment and the company is understood, and this enables managers to 
assess what effects decisions will have on the environment and vice versa. 
(Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) 
 
Figure 5 illustrates the real environment as a collection of elements, some of 
which are more significant than others, that hold relationships of varying 
strength. The environment is reflected in the cognitive representation that is a 
low resolution abstraction, and it does not picture the characteristics of the envi-
ronment to full extent. This representation determines the meaning of events 
managers perceive in the environment and how they assess the outlook of ac-
tions they take. 
 
19 
 
 
Figure 5 The environment and the cognitive representation 
 
The representations that managers have of the environment enable them to 
make rough estimations of what they expect of future outcomes. This makes it 
possible for them to compare alternative courses of action on a rudimentary 
level and allows them to choose actions that have more favorable consequenc-
es. (Gavetti et al., 2012) 
 
Although decision making is dependent on strategy frames, there are underlying 
psychological factors that complement strategy frames in describing how man-
agers make up their mind and help draw a more comprehensive picture of how 
decisions are reached, and how managers find themselves in decision making 
situations. In a nutshell, the psychological factors lead decision makers to at-
tend problems that demand an urgent solution, to search for solutions that re-
semble previous ones and to choose the first alternative that satisfies their 
needs instead of conducting exhaustive search (Gavetti et al., 2012). 
 
The search for action alternatives does not happen out of curiosity or a desire 
for understanding but because of problems that grasp managers’ attention and 
need to be solved. This is called problemistic search and it will continue until a 
solution to the problem is found. Typically, problems are recognized when the 
company fails to meet its performance goals or is expected to do so in the fore-
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seeable future. The problem can be solved by an alternative course of action 
that is expected to meet the goals or by adjusting the goals themselves to make 
an alternative acceptable. (Cyert & March, 1963) Problemistic search is often an 
iterative process where solutions are refined or replaced with new alternatives 
until a satisfactory one is reached (Gavetti et al., 2012). 
 
When deciding on a course of action, satisficing refers to the tendency to 
choose the first alternative that is expected to be satisfactory, instead of con-
tinuing the search until a definitive one is found. What is considered satisfactory 
is a subjective matter shaped by personal aspirations and the level of perfor-
mance that individuals are accustomed to. (Gavetti et al., 2012) As described 
above, what managers expect the outcome of an alternative to be depends on 
the assessment they have reached based on their strategy frame. 
 
Decision making is often marked by uncertainty when sufficient information for 
rational decisions is not available. Making far-reaching decisions in situations 
like this is generally found undesirable and avoided if possible. Such behavior is 
called uncertainty avoidance, as managers want to spare themselves from an-
ticipating future outcomes and apply decision rules to provide a solution instead. 
Rule-based thinking makes use of standard procedures and experience over 
predictive abilities, which leads managers to search alternatives that are similar 
to those that have already been in use from known areas. Furthermore, this be-
havior tends to favor rule-based decisions that are quick to yield feedback. This 
happens because acquiring feedback gives the decision maker a sense of con-
trol, as it tells whether the decision is going to the right direction and adjust-
ments can be made accordingly. (Gavetti et al., 2012) 
 
These behavioral traits also suggest that managers are more inclined to engage 
in backward-looking than forward-looking scanning in the presence of uncertain-
ty. Backward-looking scanning made use of managers’ experience and prior 
knowledge in determining what to scan in the environment as opposed to for-
ward-looking scanning that required judgement on what should be scanned giv-
en managers’ understanding of the environment. If significant uncertainty is 
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present, it is reasonable to assume that managers’ scanning decisions follow 
the same search rationale and are more likely to be governed by experience. 
 
2.4 Managerial attention 
 
The insight behind Mintzberg’s (1978) view of strategy as “a pattern in a stream 
of decisions” is that intentions and plans manifest themselves in actions, and 
that companies’ objectives and how they intend to reach them can be under-
stood by looking at what they do. However, this raises a question of the events 
and mechanisms that actually lead companies to take actions. This question 
was partly addressed above, when managers were described to expend their 
efforts on problems that pose a threat of some kind in the foreseeable future 
and that force managers to do something in response to them. The events that 
lead to action, therefore, often have the quality of urgency, but this does not 
explain how managers come to discover such problems in the first place.  
 
Ocasio (1997) asserts that what companies do depends on what managers pay 
attention to. He proposes a model called the attention-based view of firm that 
explains how managerial attention works in organizations and how it affects 
what actions are taken. The model operates on three levels: (1) an individual 
level, which explains the workings of attention in individual managers, (2) a so-
cial level, which describes how the everyday conduct of business and the situa-
tions managers find themselves in affect what managers pay attention to, and 
(3) an organizational level, which outlines the organizational factors that deter-
mine the nature of the situations managers will confront and in what context. 
 
The first level, the individual level, is called focus of attention, where the con-
cept of attention refers to the concentration of an individual’s effort and mental 
faculties on a specific task. This concentration is a state of mind that focuses 
cognitive processing to a limited set of elements and ignores everything else 
with the sole purpose of completion of the task. Managers’ attention can be di-
rected to issues and answers, which Ocasio (1997, p. 194) defines as “the cul-
tural and cognitive repertoire of schemas available to decision-makers to make 
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sense of (issues), and to respond to (answers) environmental stimuli”. Issues, 
therefore, embody the meaning of environmental stimuli; they are the manner in 
which events are framed and understood as opportunities, problems or threats, 
for example. Similarly, answers represent the ideas of how certain actions work 
as a response to an issue. The issues and answers managers attend to ulti-
mately determine what they do. (Ocasio, 1997) 
 
The second level, the social level, is referred to as situated attention and it is 
grounded in the notion that situational characteristics affect the actions and 
thinking of individuals. Individuals’ propensity to litter in a public place, for ex-
ample, depends on the characteristics of their immediate surroundings, namely 
the degree of litter visible on the ground and whether they see other people litter 
or not. In an organizational setting, procedural and communication channels 
refer to the formal and informal activities, communications and interactions that 
managers confront inside their organization, examples of which are official 
meetings, reports and discussions. These activities determine what environ-
mental stimuli reach managers and what issues and answers they have availa-
ble for consideration. (Ocasio, 1997)   
 
Let us imagine that, for example, a manager participates in a meeting with 
product development, where it is brought to his attention that a competitor has 
developed a new product, and the product development team expresses a con-
cern of this event and outlines the probable consequences of the event on the 
company’s business and presents ideas of what to do in response to it. Here, 
the characteristics of the situation, the manager’s interactions with others in the 
meeting, direct his attention to specific issues and answers that then affect what 
he decides to do. 
 
The third level, the organizational level, is called structural distribution of atten-
tion and consists of four organizational factors: (1) rules of the game, that are 
the principles that guide behavior and action and that establish a common 
ground of what is considered appropriate and legitimate inside the organization, 
(2) players, who are the individuals or groups of individuals that exert influence 
by regulating procedures, endorsing personal values and beliefs or promoting 
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issues, (3) structural positions, that refer to the specialized roles that individuals 
represent in the organization and that are reflected in their identity and interests, 
and (4) resources, that are the organizations assets and capabilities that allow it 
to perform its activities, and that are important to the legitimization of answers, 
since they define what the company is actually able to do. Together these four 
factors form a concept of attention structures and they govern managers’ atten-
tion in an organization by defining the fundamental characteristics of the proce-
dural and communication channels where managers operate. (Ocasio, 1997) 
 
Practically speaking, players form the social interaction and influence the ex-
change of issues and answers in the procedural and communication channels 
through their skills and beliefs. The behavior of both managers and players are 
regulated by the rules of the game, and their roles and identities are shaped by 
their structural position, namely the organizational function they are placed in. 
Furthermore, rules and resources together define the legitimacy and importance 
of issues and answers. (Ocasio, 1997) 
 
In the previous example of the meeting between a manager and product devel-
opment, the fact that the meeting was arranged placed the manager into a situ-
ation where his attention was directed to certain issues and answers. If he 
hadn’t attended the meeting, his attention would have been somewhere else 
instead of the issues presented there. This is an example of how routines and 
everyday arrangements govern managerial attention, and it is important to high-
light that organizations have control over their procedures and activities and it 
follows to reason that they can modify where attention is directed to by modify-
ing their procedures and activities. A company might consider, for example, that 
it holds periodic meetings where the specific topic of discussion is the actions of 
their competitors, thereby directing attention to issues of a certain kind on a 
regular basis. Furthermore, the company could invite other organizational func-
tions and other managers to the same meeting, and effectively increase the 
amount of players at the table and broaden the range of issues and answers 
available to managers. 
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Examples of such modification of procedures and activities are provided by Jo-
seph and Ocasio (2012), who showed how the creation of communication 
channels between business units and corporate headquarters improved the im-
plementation of strategic plans and the adaptive capabilities at General Electric. 
Their study concluded that an organizational arrangement lacking in communi-
cation between business units and the headquarters leads, for example, the 
headquarters to enforce plans that would later create problems when imple-
mented by the business units. The introduction of communication channels be-
tween the two organizational levels, however, resolved the situation by allowing 
business units to direct headquarters’ attention, facilitating an exchange of per-
ceptions of the environment between the two and leading to improved adaptive 
capabilities. 
 
Other empirical examinations of the attention-based view of the firm include 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008), who studied how subsidiaries can draw the 
attention of their corporate headquarters to attain positive attention in the form 
of support and recognition and who identified factors contributing to the degree 
of positive attention subsidiaries receive. For example, headquarters assess the 
weight and importance of subsidiaries, namely how attractive the markets 
where they operate are to the future performance of the corporation and the 
relative extent to which other subsidiaries depend on the subsidiary and the 
heavier the subsidiary the more attention it will garner. In addition, the appear-
ance the subsidiaries elicit through the initiatives they create to develop their 
businesses, and the specific measures they take to establish credibility can ele-
vate the subsidiary above others, pulling in attention in the process. 
 
Furthermore, the geographic distance between headquarters and a subsidiary 
affects attention negatively, since managers generally have a weaker under-
standing of remote areas compared to those in their vicinity. Another impeding 
problem that subsidiaries can face is their underlying capabilities and their func-
tionality in the corporation and the risk of being labeled less relevant by default. 
For example, R&D units are generally considered to carry an inherent weight 
heavier than that of sales. The practical implications for subsidiaries and their 
managers outlined by Bouquet and Birkinshaw are that they can foster a posi-
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tion of strength through activities that make other subsidiaries dependent on 
their actions or through initiatives that enhance their appearance. (Bouquet & 
Birkinshaw, 2008) 
 
It is noteworthy that Joseph and Ocasio (2012) highlight that important issues 
often emerge in the lower levels of an organization as opposed to the headquar-
ters, and they herald middle managers as powerhouses of new initiatives. Their 
power is effectively unleashed only if there are procedural and communication 
channels where they can interact with senior management and affect manage-
ment’s attention. On a similar note, Mintzberg (1994, p. 113) emphasizes the 
role and contributions of employees outside of decision makers and how they 
can offer them “alternative conceptual interpretations of their world”. An exam-
ple of how the inability to change managerial thinking can affect businesses is 
provided by Tripsas and Gavetti (2000), who showed how managerial beliefs at 
Polaroid created rigidities that prevented the company from adapting itself to a 
changing environment. 
 
There is a detail in the Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) study that is worthy of further 
attention. The study explains how there were managers who urged top man-
agement to revise their thinking in a clash that lasted for years. The case was 
not, therefore, that employees would have lacked the opportunities to challenge 
the beliefs of senior management; it was senior management’s cognitive inertia 
– the tendency of existing beliefs to defy contradicting evidence and to endure – 
that rendered such interactions unfruitful from the lower-level managers’ per-
spective. In this respect, it seems clear that the communications and sharing of 
perceptions that occurred between senior and middle management didn’t 
amount to much at Polaroid. 
 
Although Joseph and Ocasio (2012) did show that General Electric did benefit 
from communication and interaction channels and did improve its adaptive ca-
pabilities as a result, their findings mainly concern organizational structure and 
design and the notion that such channels are a prerequisite for middle and top 
management to share perceptions and to improve co-ordination. Furthermore, 
Vuori and Huy (2016) stress that the existence of channels in itself does not 
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guarantee that something useful will eventually happen; it is the quality of inter-
action that occurs between people in the channels that decides the outcome. 
The contribution of the Vuori and Huy and the Tripsas and Gavetti (2000) stud-
ies is that they examine the issues that complicate interaction between top and 
middle management and that they outline the effects that these issues have. 
While Tripsas and Gavetti focused on cognitive issues, Vuori and Huy focused 
on shared emotions. 
 
Vuori and Huy (2016) sought to understand the relationship between top and 
middle management at Nokia corporation during the problematic times following 
Apple’s introduction of the iPhone – a product that greatly disturbed the market 
for mobile phones. The practice of business at Nokia was such that top man-
agement’s attention focused on the external environment and that middle man-
agement focused on internal matters and the implementation of plans under top 
management’s direction. A phenomenon that followed this design and that was 
exacerbated by the increasing threat of the iPhone was the shared emotions in 
top and middle management. 
 
Top management feared external factors, such as lagging behind competitors 
or disappointing investors in quarterly reports, while middle management feared 
internal factors, such as the negative reactions of top management and the 
threat of losing their jobs. These shared emotions in top and middle manage-
ment produced behaviors that had detrimental effects on the interactions and 
communications between these two levels of management. The emphasis of 
the study was on product development and innovation, and top management 
would, for example, pressure middle managers in developing new products and 
solutions, and middle managers would knowingly announce unrealistic sched-
ules or refrain from discussing issues. The prevailing emotional factors and their 
side effects were seen to contribute to the declining quality of Nokia products 
and to the company’s ultimate withdrawal from the mobile phone market. (Vuori 
& Huy, 2016) 
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2.5 Formal intelligence teams in organizations 
 
It is generally accepted that companies are bombarded with more information 
than they can handle, and most of the information that top managers receive 
comes from subordinates (Hammond, 1994). In some cases, companies deploy 
specialized units to conduct environmental scanning in an organized process of 
intelligence (Gilad, 1989). The professionals carrying out these activities are 
called intelligence practitioners (Jin & Ju, 2014). In the view of Lenz and 
Engledow (1986), the purpose of such a unit is to gather and interpret infor-
mation from the external environment and to support decision making through 
their analyses. Stubbart (1982) points out that managers are easily consumed 
by short-run problems, and entertains the idea that a scanning unit would act as 
a counterbalance of sorts by drawing attention towards issues that could threat-
en the company in the future and help prepare against them. 
 
Reflecting on Daft and Weick’s (1984) four modes of interpretation, it is reason-
able to think that companies engaging in the modes of conditioned viewing or 
discovery are more prone to have a dedicated unit carrying out scanning and 
analysis activities. Conditioned viewing was characterized by scanning through 
established procedures and producing routine reports and documentation. Dis-
covering also engages in formal data collection but unlike conditioned viewing, 
the primary focus is not on routines that collect data concerning fixed topics, but 
rather on studying the environment and seeking answers to important ques-
tions. Lenz and Engledow (1986) found that the characteristics of companies’ 
intelligence processes correspond to those of the discovery mode. 
 
In contrast, the remaining two modes of interpretation do not collect formal data 
systematically. The mode of undirected viewing mainly utilized personal net-
works and informal data, and the enacting mode was concerned with taking ac-
tions that produce reactions in the environment, not with data collection per se. 
Both of them do collect data, but do not require a specialized unit for scanning 
activities. 
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The chief benefits of intelligence units are that they broaden scanning beyond 
what managers can do by themselves, and identify issues by interpreting what 
they see (Lenz & Engledow, 1986). Lenz and Engledow’s study on ten large 
North-American corporations known for the prowess of their environmental 
scanning units suggests that interpretation of data is what made the units valu-
able to companies. 
 
In a recent paper, Jin and Ju (2014) outline the general task structure of intelli-
gence practitioners. Firstly, they gather data on specific matters commonly re-
ferred to as key intelligence topics or key intelligence questions (KIT/KIQ). Sec-
ondly, they are responsible for processing and structuring the data into a com-
prehensible form. Thirdly, they judge the data and try to predict issues and chal-
lenges, and then devise plans and solutions on what the company should do in 
response to them. 
 
The study of Ghoshal and Westney (1991) provides the most detailed examina-
tion of the relationship between intelligence teams and management so far. The 
main problems they were able to identify between the co-operation of intelli-
gence teams and management pertained to managerial culture and the per-
ceived relevance of the teams’ outputs to the organization. The issues concern-
ing managerial culture were manifest in managers’ reluctance to use analyses 
created by the teams. The managerial culture could, for example, downplay the 
importance of monitoring the competitive environment or display a style that 
relied more on managers’ personal intuition than on a sharing of information. 
 
Furthermore, Ghoshal and Westney (1991) found that the teams lacked credibil-
ity in the eyes of management, which made it difficult for the teams to produce 
intelligence that could be perceived as relevant. They identified two important 
factors underlying this phenomenon. Firstly, managers generally perceived the 
teams to lack in experience pertaining to their businesses and believed that the 
teams are not able to understand and interpret information. Secondly, a high 
rate of turnover in teams prevented managers from developing trusting relation-
ships with individuals in the teams, which further exacerbated the situation. The 
lack of credibility was detrimental to the teams and led to an atmosphere where 
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the teams would rather refrain from interpreting information than risk being 
wrong. 
 
According to Lenz and Engledow (1986), companies’ scanning units can take 
three organizational roles. Units of the public policy role scan the general envi-
ronment to detect emerging trends that would affect the company as a whole 
and bring them to the attention of managers. A unit of this kind does try to influ-
ence managers by raising awareness of broad trends and introducing new per-
spectives to their thinking. The strategic planning integrated role is connected 
with decision making through direct interaction in planning processes. Units of 
this role scan for strategic issues that have a recognized impact in the environ-
ment and introduce them periodically to managers. Furthermore, they are re-
sponsible for preparing an environmental forecast for the business as a whole. 
The functioned-oriented role is concerned with matters pertaining to a single 
organizational function within the company. It is activated by pressing issues, 
and typically seeks answers to well-specified problems. 
 
Lenz and Engledow (1986) state that conforming to managements’ planning 
processes does help intelligence units ensure the relevance of their outputs, but 
the teams then risk adopting a role where they simply apply standardized pro-
cedures and definitions to everything they do. Such a role, they argue, would be 
characterized by repetition and smother unconventional thinking about the envi-
ronment that would be valuable if the teams wish to be effective in detecting 
changes. 
 
Stubbart (1982) questions scanning units and argues that establishing such 
units is unlikely to pay off. He argues that such units can hardly produce any-
thing genuinely useful to the company since the essence of environmental 
scanning is in interpretation, and in his view the persons best suited for the task 
are the managers, who are already well acquainted with their environments. 
Stubbart (1982, p. 144) explicitly states that such teams “do not have a system 
for defining, measuring, and interpreting a business unit’s environment more 
accurately than the unit’s own management can”. Similar to the view of Daft and 
Weick (1984), his thinking frames interpretation as a process occurring solely 
amongst managers. 
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A great deal of recent literature on organized intelligence deals with techniques, 
such as applied mathematics (Welter, Mayer, & Quick, 2013), information sys-
tems (Jin & Ju, 2014) and scanning solutions for the Internet (Lau, Liao, Wong, 
& Chiu, 2012), and with methodology, such as task structures and objectives 
(Bartes, 2011; Calof & Wright, 2008). A different view point is presented by Ce-
kuls (2015, p. 248), who conducted a survey in intelligence units in Latvian 
companies and found that more than half of the respondents reported problems 
that could be generally described as “communication gaps” and “inefficient lev-
els of collaboration” and he suggests that these problems arise from differences 
in culture and values between the intelligence units and the rest of the organiza-
tion. 
 
In addition, Wright, Eid and Fleisher (2009) covered the attitudes of senior ex-
ecutives towards organized intelligence operations in UK retail banks through a 
survey questionnaire. They found that the self-reported sentiment of executives 
is supportive towards the intelligence operations in their companies. The study 
of Cekuls and the study of Wright et al. are, unfortunately, bounded by the lim-
ited expressive power of their survey responses and are unable to provide in-
sight on how their conclusions play out in organizational reality. 
 
2.6 Bridging intelligence with managerial cognition and atten-
tion 
 
The perspectives of managerial cognition and attention described above make 
managers subject to considerable limitations. Due to bounded rationality, man-
agers’ ability to model the environment in abstract, cognitive representations is 
incomplete. Managers cannot, therefore, predict the environment with certainty 
and can only make rough estimations of what they believe future outcomes to 
be. In addition, the concept of attention suggests that managers can only cover 
a limited range of issues in the environment over a certain period of time. More-
over, where managers’ attention is focused in the environment is greatly influ-
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enced by the activities and communications they take part in and the intricate 
social workings of these situations. 
 
In light of the considerations outlined above, utilizing an intelligence team does 
present itself as a compelling idea. As advocated by Lenz and Engledow (1986) 
and Ghoshal and Westney (1991), for example, an intelligence team could ob-
serve more in the environment than what managers could alone and then inter-
pret what they see. An intelligence team could, therefore, (1) increase the atten-
tional capacity that the organization directs towards the environment, (2) in-
crease the amount of individuals trying to make sense of the environment and 
(3) broaden the repertoire of interpretations available for managements’ consid-
eration. 
 
Figure 6 below illustrates how intelligence teams and management both scan 
the environment, the teams primarily in their formal scanning procedures and 
managers in their less formal, personal scanning activities. The teams’ and 
management’s attention is governed by the sphere of attention-mediating fac-
tors, namely the activities and communications they take part in, and these fac-
tors will determine what will grasp their attention either inside the organization 
or in the environment. Most importantly, the teams bring environmental data 
and interpretations to the attention of management in the activities and chan-
nels where they interact with each other. Both the teams and management are 
equipped with their own schemas that are responsible for interpreting the envi-
ronment and management’s schemas would also judge the relevance of the 
interpretations the teams present to them. Furthermore, schemas also govern 
scanning either through a backward-looking or a forward-looking scanning logic. 
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Figure 6 Management, the intelligence team and the attention-mediating factors 
 
So far, managers have expressed a concern of intelligence teams lacking the 
business experience required to understand the environment (Ghoshal & West-
ney, 1991). In an extreme case of an intelligence team operating in disconnec-
tion of the rest of the business it would not have the underlying mental models 
necessary to interpret information specific to the business, and would simply 
resemble a data bank holding a collection of observations void of structure and 
meaning. In fact, there would seem to be very little reason against outsourcing 
such a unit. It is not a surprise that achieving shared conceptions between the 
teams and management appears crucial to managements’ perception of the 
teams’ usefulness. However, reaching favorable conditions for intelligence 
teams to operate and then capitalizing on it has proven a difficult task. 
 
Generally speaking, previous literature suggests that managers want more in-
terpretation and less data from intelligence teams. According to Ghoshal and 
Westney (1991, p. 22), for example, managers explain that “it [the intelligence 
team] has to answer real questions” and “I want to know what he [a competitor] 
is going to do to me tomorrow”. Managers, however, can also find it difficult to 
specify what they actually need. In addition, managerial preconceptions and 
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attitudes can discourage the teams from interpreting the environment. (Ghoshal 
& Westney, 1991) The teams, therefore, can find themselves in a contradictory 
position where their goal is to provide interpretations but where they operate 
under conditions that do not support such behavior. 
 
Having the teams conform to the needs laid out in explicit planning procedures 
is likely to help ensure some degree of relevance of the teams in the eyes of 
management. This can, however, be counterproductive and discourage the 
teams from original thinking and from expressing their ideas. The problem boils 
down to the degree of freedom these teams are granted; giving too much au-
tonomy is perceived to risk the teams’ relevance to the organization and man-
agement, while giving too little would compromise their ability to interpret the 
environment and to detect changes. 
 
Beck and Plowman (2009) call for managers to recognize their limitations and to 
be mindful of the human tendency to overly simplify matters and to establish 
autocratic claims. They argue that no individual is always accurate in their inter-
pretations and that the breadth of individual contexts that allows variety in inter-
pretations is an asset. An organization can try to collectively ensure a meaning-
ful interpretation if there is a forum for exchanging perceptions. Eisenhardt 
(1989) studied companies operating in rapidly changing environments and 
found that a malleable decision making style, where multiple possibilities are 
considered concurrently and where understanding is refined in a fluid manner 
by tapping the knowledge of others, will outperform an authoritative style, where 
managers work alone and commit to a single course of action although they are 
not able to confirm the viability of their choice in advance. 
 
Thomas, Shankster and Mathieu (1994, p. 1278) write that interpretation “does 
not essentially involve modeling an objective reality, but it does entail identifying 
whose reality is going to be attended to [emphasis added]”. What would the or-
ganizational arrangements and conditions be that allowed this who to be an in-
telligence team? How would their behavior play out in such cases and with what 
outcomes? So far, it has been argued that such behavior could be beneficial to 
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organizations, and even wanted by many managers, but the explicit question of 
how this would actually happen in organizations remains largely unaddressed.  
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3 Methods 
3.1 Data collection 
 
This thesis was conducted as a qualitative study, where twelve individuals from 
four companies were interviewed about the intelligence operations at their com-
panies and how the output of those operations is put to use. Each company fea-
tured interviewees of two kinds: representatives of the intelligence teams, work-
ing in the capacity of either an analyst or a director of the team, and business 
managers that used the outcomes of that team’s work in carrying out their own 
jobs. Interviewees from the intelligence teams represented such titles as “Ana-
lyst”, “Senior Analyst” and “Director of Business Intelligence”. The interviewees 
from management were responsible for a variety of organizational functions in-
cluding product management, sales, business development and strategy, and 
they represented such titles as “Portfolio Director”, “VP, Strategy & Develop-
ment” and “SVP of Business Development”. The purpose of interviewing people 
both from intelligence teams and from management was to gain viewpoints on 
how the co-operation between these two parties was arranged from both sides. 
 
I received assistance from M-Brain Oy – the commissioner of the thesis and a 
company specialized in intelligence services and consulting. The company ap-
proached the intelligence teams at eight companies with a request of collabora-
tion by giving interviews for the thesis. Four companies gave a positive re-
sponse, and further interviews inside the companies were arranged through the 
assistance of the persons interviewed there first. In exchange for their efforts, 
everyone taking part in the interviews were granted a copy of the future thesis. 
All four companies were large, multinational enterprises with annual revenues of 
1 to 5 billion Euros and with over 10 000 employees each. 
 
The interviews were carried out over a three-month period during autumn 2015, 
and all interviews were recorded and transcribed with the exception of two in-
stances: a follow-up call with one of the interviewees to ask questions regarding 
a specific occurrence that emerged in the original interview and one interview 
that was conducted solely via telephone, and both of these instances were 
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stored in written notes on paper. The interviews were conducted in Finnish and 
their length ranged from 30 to 90 minutes. 
 
Specific interview questions were prepared in advance and the interviews fol-
lowed a semi-structured manner where the questions established pre-
determined topics that were then further defined with context-specific questions 
with the intention of encouraging the interviewees to elaborate their thinking as 
the interview progressed. The interviews revolved around three principal topics: 
(1) what environmental data is collected by the intelligence teams, (2) the man-
ner in which this data is put to use in the organization and (3) how the collabora-
tion between the teams and management is arranged and the nature of these 
collaborative actions.  
 
Two sets of interview questions were used: one for the interviewees from the 
intelligence teams and one for those from business management. Both sets of 
questions dealt with similar topics but took the nature of the interviewees’ posi-
tion in the company into account in wording and the viewpoints that the ques-
tions took. Moreover, I transcribed and analyzed every interview to gain further 
ideas of what to pay attention to with the context-specific questions in later in-
terviews. 
 
The semi-structured conduct of the interviews served an underlying purpose of 
exploration. Although the interview questions did establish pre-determined top-
ics of interest, they were meant to initiate discussion rather than to acquire ex-
plicit answers, and the goal of the context specific questions that emerged dur-
ing the interviews was to spark the interviewees to speak freely. Also, inter-
viewees were asked to provide concrete examples around the themes that were 
covered. For example, when asked how the environmental data collected by the 
intelligence teams was put to use, the interviewees were asked if they can recall 
any examples of situations where this has occurred and of how it happened. 
Generally speaking, my guiding principle when carrying out the interviews was 
that of disregarding presuppositions in favor of discovery. 
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3.2 Data analysis 
 
Analyzing the interview data followed the methodology outlined by Gioia, Corley 
and Hamilton (2013). The underlying idea of their methodology is that the reality 
of organizations can be understood by investigating how people do things and 
how they experience what they do. It is one thing to know why things are done, 
but it is explaining how they are done – the process of making things happen – 
that is most revealing. Uncovering such human processes happens through 
qualitative interviews, and they aim to provide a system for inferring understand-
ing from interview data and for reporting the conclusions in a revelatory yet rig-
orous manner. The central idea in reporting findings is to present conclusions 
and the underlying evidence of those conclusions, the interview excerpts that 
they are inferred from, in tandem. 
 
The data analysis began with open coding, which is the process of examining 
phenomena and events described in the data and essentially answering the 
question “what do they represent” and labeling them accordingly (Strauss & 
Corbin, 1998). Examples of such coding were distinct instances in the interview 
data that were coded as “the team challenges others’ thinking” or “the organiza-
tion is dismissive towards the team’s work”. According to the Gioia et al. (2013, 
p. 20) methodology, coding is followed (1) by grouping the codes based on 
some unifying characteristic, (2) by further abstraction of such groups of codes 
into conceptual themes that describe the phenomena manifested in these 
groups and (3) by the formulation of a “data structure”. This data structure out-
lines the chain of reasoning that produces higher-order meaning from the inter-
view data. 
 
Practically speaking, the data structure operates on three levels: first-order 
codes, second-order themes and aggregate dimensions. First-order codes pre-
sent the underlying evidence in the data and are the referents of the second-
order, conceptual themes in organizational reality. Aggregate dimensions, in 
turn, bridge second-order themes together into even broader concepts. (Gioia et 
al., 2013) Figure 7 below presents the data structure developed on the interview 
data in this thesis. As the analysis process went forward it was recognized that 
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the themes and aggregate dimensions were manifest in two of the four compa-
nies interviewed: company A, a business operating in the consumer products 
industry and company B, a business operating in the forest industry. Both com-
panies featured two interviews, one from a representative from the intelligence 
team and one from management. 
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4 Findings 
4.1 Intelligence teams as update mechanisms 
 
The interview data indicates that intelligence teams have the capacity to facili-
tate change in organizational beliefs in a process where they operate as an up-
date mechanism. This operation is the joint effect of two smaller scale opera-
tions called identifying unsound beliefs and facilitating change in beliefs. Identi-
fying unsound beliefs is the two-step process of (1) the teams’ noticing of other 
organizational members’ beliefs concerning the environment – statements or 
conditions they express to hold true – when the teams carry out their activities, 
co-operate with others and engage in discussions and of (2) the teams’ subse-
quent recognition of an inconsistency between the beliefs they have observed 
and the understanding they have of the environment. 
 
Facilitating change in beliefs, in turn, refers to the measures the teams take to 
argue against the unsound beliefs with the use of corroborating evidence. This 
evidence and the teams’ argument together represent an alternative to the orig-
inal, unsound belief, and the substitution of the original belief with the teams’ 
alternative is regarded as the process of “updating”. Since the teams are the 
organizational units that initiate this process they can be described as “update 
mechanisms”. Table 1 summarizes the evidence of intelligence teams as up-
date mechanisms and the following sections 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 examine this evi-
dence in greater detail. 
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4.1.1 Identifying unsound beliefs 
The representatives from the intelligence teams at companies A and B both 
demonstrated a sense of vigilance towards other organizational members’ think-
ing, and most importantly, they evaluated the thinking they observed against 
their own understanding of the environment. The representative of the intelli-
gence team at company A reported that, for example, their team encounters 
“hearsay circulating through the corridors” and “fixated ways of thinking”. She 
elaborated the following on her thoughts: 
 
                                                  Table 1     
                                 Evidence of Intelligence Teams as Update Mechanisms
Second-order Theme Company A Company B
Identifying 
Unsound Beliefs
The team recognized that the company's 
sales organization believed their 
products to be more expensive than the 
competition's, a belief the team 
recognized as incorrect based on the 
data they had. In addition, the 
interviewee from the intelligence team 
commented that their team encounters 
“hearsay circulating through the 
corridors” and “fixated ways of 
thinking”. She reported that 
“…occasionally you’ll notice people 
making statements on something they 
have heard somewhere, and they’ll say 
that’s how things are, and then we have 
to make an effort and show data, for 
example, that actually says otherwise”.                                                                     
The team realized that their sales 
organization didn't fully appreciate 
current market conditions. 
Furthermore, the interviewee from the 
intelligence team raised concern of 
others restricting their breadth of view 
and becoming “blind” and said that in 
situations like that she "tries to awaken 
them" and "to illuminate how what 
they have at hand isn’t necessarily the 
full truth”.
Facilitating Change 
in Beliefs
The intelligence team argued against the 
sales organization's belief concerning 
their products' pricing level by showing 
concrete evidence. Initially, the sales 
organization's original belief endured, 
but the team repeated their view and 
reported that the belief dissipated over 
time and that subsequently the team 
had been requested to “monitor prices 
more carefully”.
Having realized that the sales function 
didn't fully recognize current market 
conditions, the intelligence team 
explained their views with the use of 
data-driven analyses in a meeting with 
the sales function. Part of the sales 
function got really upset, and an 
athmosphere of disappointment 
followed, but the sales function later 
thanked the team and said they will 
have to recognize the risks the team 
had pointed out.
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“…occasionally you’ll notice people making statements on something they have 
heard somewhere, and they’ll say that’s how things are, and then we have to 
make an effort and show data, for example, that actually says otherwise, and 
we have to rectify these kinds of assumptions.” 
 
Similarly, the representative of the intelligence team at company B brought up 
an issue of organizational members pigeonholing themselves to their own busi-
nesses, restricting their breadth of view and becoming “blind” and explained that 
often when outlooks are bad, people don’t necessarily want to hear about them 
and face them in their organization. When asked what she can do in situations 
like this, she replied: ”I try to awaken them, I try to illuminate how what they 
have at hand isn’t necessarily the full truth”. As described above, intelligence 
teams can operate as update mechanisms when the identification of unsound 
beliefs is followed by the teams facilitating change in beliefs. The following sec-
tion shows two examples where the teams operated in this manner. 
 
4.1.2 Facilitating change in beliefs 
The interviews with the representatives of the intelligence teams revealed two 
instances where the teams had first identified an unsound belief and then con-
tinued to facilitate change in the belief. Table 1 outlines the main features of 
these occurrences. The team at company A had recognized that there was a 
misunderstanding concerning the pricing level of their products, and the team 
sought to change this belief. The team at company B, in turn, had observed that 
the company’s sales organization didn’t fully appreciate current market condi-
tions and concluded that they have to bring the sales organization’s conception 
of the market up to date. These situations were characterized by the teams’ de-
termination to explain their view and to show how they thought the organiza-
tions’ understanding was insufficient or incorrect. In both cases, the organiza-
tional members that were subject to the teams’ undertaking were initially quite 
determined to stand behind their original beliefs, and change in the beliefs was 
not immediate. 
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At company A, the intelligence team had realized that the organization, and the 
sales function in particular, had expressed the belief that “we are expensive” 
and the organization had initiated discussions of lowering prices. However, the 
intelligence team recognized that things were not how the rest of the organiza-
tion believed them to be – they had price data showing that they were not more 
expensive than the competition. Here, we can see how the team noticed an or-
ganizational belief and then recognized that actual environmental data does not 
support the claim it makes. The representative from the intelligence team ex-
plained the events: 
 
 “…there’s an idea, for example, of the general price level of our product range 
compared to our competitors. We have actual price data collected on this mat-
ter, and despite us having shown this data and having said that things are not 
how they think they are – they are saying our competitors’ products are less 
expensive than ours and think that’s why they sell more – and we present data 
showing that this isn’t actually true. I felt that later on they’d forgotten about the 
fact and returned to the old thinking…“ 
 
A brief follow-up call with the interviewee illuminated the ultimate resolution of 
the occurrence. As was mentioned, the team observed that initially the original 
belief did endure, but the follow-up call revealed that the team had been repeat-
ing their view and that the belief had dissipated over time. Furthermore, the in-
terviewee told that the team had been requested to “monitor prices more care-
fully” in the future. In addition, the interviewee mentioned that there had been 
issues related to certain individuals inhibiting the team’s progress, and that the 
team winning credibility over them was important to their achievement. 
 
It is possible to think that the belief concerning the products’ pricing level mani-
fested itself in the interpretation of “we are expensive”, which was reflected in 
the discussions of lowering prices. Hence, by arguing against the belief of the 
company’s pricing level, the team simultaneously questioned the interpretation 
and the action plans associated with it. Furthermore, this example shows how 
the team was able to strengthen itself. After facilitating change in the belief they 
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were asked to “monitor prices more carefully”, and the team’s success had, 
therefore, tilted organizational conditions to their favor. 
 
The representative of the intelligence team at company B described a case 
where the team argued against the conception that the company’s sales organi-
zation had of the market. In this case, the unsound belief refers to the sales or-
ganization’s thinking and behavior that, in the intelligence team’s opinion, didn’t 
fully appreciate current market conditions. The team was invited to a meeting to 
review market outlooks, and the team then explained their views to the sales 
organization. She recalled her thoughts on this occurrence: 
 
”One example of what has happened is that sales figures at a certain business 
area have declined and the prospects are weak, but the sales department be-
lieves in what they’re doing and arranges sales meetings, and they’ll ask us to 
present where the markets are, what competitors are doing, and what are the 
outlooks, and they are probably anticipating something empowering and posi-
tive. But in reality when we’ve attended these meetings, what we’ve had to say 
has been much more neutral and even emphasizing the risks and threats.” 
 
In this example, we can see how the intelligence team judged that the sales 
organization had not fully accepted weakening prospects and was in a state that 
could be described as unwarranted optimism. Her testimonies indicate that the 
intelligence team wanted to draw the attention of the sales organization to the 
data that the team considered to describe the market and to their view that 
these figures should be acknowledged and addressed. As in the case of com-
pany A, the organizational members who were subject to the team’s efforts 
didn’t display immediate acceptance of the team’s views. The interviewee from 
company B explained her thoughts on the events that followed: 
 
“Once part of the group got really upset, because they weren’t prepared to hear 
something like that, it’s possible some of them subconsciously realized that their 
products haven’t been selling and that there are challenges, and some of them 
were well aware of this, but I think the fact that someone external, we were an 
external party in respect to them, explains the situation and shows figures, it 
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can appear blunt, but we’ve managed these situations through discussions and 
we’ve heard a thanks afterwards, but we didn’t hear it when we brought the is-
sues up… …There was an atmosphere of anger for some time afterwards and I 
felt we were left a bit outside for a while, it was something like a month or a 
month and a half later when we heard a thank you, they said thank you for 
bringing these things up and that they’ll have to acknowledge the risks in the 
future.” 
 
Altogether, both intelligence teams facilitated change in beliefs by explaining 
their views with the use of environmental data. The team at company A suc-
cessfully argued the organization’s belief of their products’ pricing level to be 
unjustified. At company B, the team directed the sales organization’s attention 
to their views and helped the organization come to terms with current market 
conditions, essentially facilitating change in the organization’s conception of the 
market. It is also important how the teams were involved in activities and dis-
cussions in their organizations: the team at company B was invited to a meet-
ing, which gave the team the opportunity to express their thinking, and the team 
at company A took part in discussions and kept repeating their view. It is clear 
that engagement and interaction with others was crucial to the teams in these 
cases. The following section dives further into these organizational aspects. 
 
4.2 Organizational conditions and context 
 
Organizational conditions and context refer to the culture and arrangements that 
influence the teams’ actions inside the organization. The interview data sug-
gests that these factors can be broken down to three subcomponents. Two of 
these subcomponents are considered to support the teams’ actions while the 
third hinders them. Table 2 provides an overview of the three subcomponents 
and of the underlying evidence in the interview data. 
 
First of the supporting factors is called culture supporting the teams and it de-
scribes the atmosphere that manifests itself in the behavior of other organiza-
tional members and in how they judge the intelligence teams. A supporting cul-
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ture is one that incorporates reasoning justified by environmental data in deci-
sion making and that values the teams’ cause in general, and the influence of 
the CEO can be particularly important in establishing such a culture. 
 
 
 
                             Table 2    
                    Evidence of Organizational Conditions & Context
Second-order Theme Company A Company B
Culture Supporting the 
Teams
There is a culture of incorporating 
environmental data into decision making. 
The interviewee from the intelligence 
team commented on the strong presence 
of the company's CEO: "Our CEO strongly 
supports the idea that we must have a 
team that produces information, and he’s 
a person that wants decisions backed up 
with information... ...he insists others to 
ground their decisions in facts". The 
interviewee from management 
commented that the team's work is 
utilized because "we want to make sure 
that the conclusions we make are 
supported by facts”.
No evidence of concrete behavior 
of other organizational members 
was present in the interview data. 
However, the interviewee from 
the intelligence team commented 
that the team promotes a culture 
where “information is 
incorporated into decision 
making” and that “everyone 
would ask themselves what 
information they need and what 
our company needs in order to 
compete”.
Integrating the Teams 
into Activities and 
Procedures
The team is involved in strategic projects 
and in analyzing consumers and 
competitors. The team provides 
interpretations of the market and advises 
managers in the search for relevant 
information. Furthermore, the team 
makes suggestions for future actions in 
product development: "the team goes 
through numerous information sources, 
and then they come to us and tell us that, 
for instance, consumption in one of our 
product areas has decreased and they 
explain the reasons why that has 
happened and tell us if we want to 
achieve growth there again, this is what 
we should do, based on certain facts of 
the market".
The team's efforts play a part in 
"finding growth" for the company 
and they are responsible for 
identifying prospective new 
customers and assessing markets. 
The team's outputs assist in 
making sense of the environment.
Reservation and 
Opposition Towards 
the Teams' Views
The attitude towards the information 
provided by the team can be dismissive. 
Someone from "higher up in the 
organization" displays opposition 
towards the view of a declining market, 
despite having seen data that 
corroborates the view.
The interviewee from 
management is cautious about 
data provided by external sources 
and delivered by the team. The 
legitimacy of the team's views is 
questioned, and they compete 
with other internal information 
sources for management's 
attention.
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The second supporting factor is called integrating the teams into activities and 
procedures and it refers to the concrete activities that provide the teams the 
opportunities to interact and exert influence and that demonstrate the manner in 
which their work is put to use. The teams can, for example, provide input to pro-
jects and take part in meetings and discussions where they have the chance to 
express their views. 
 
The third, inhibiting subcomponent is referred to as reservation and opposition 
towards the teams’ views and it outlines factors that can complicate the teams’ 
work and inhibit their progress. This subcomponent manifests itself in the be-
havior of other organizational members that works against the teams and their 
goals. Most importantly, this behavior shows in organizational members’ skepti-
cism towards the data sources the teams utilize and in the reluctance to consid-
er the teams’ views and the evidence that contradicts their beliefs. These fac-
tors are most notably present in the opposition the teams face when they facili-
tate change in organizational beliefs. 
 
4.2.1 Culture supporting the teams 
Evidence of a supporting organizational culture was mainly present in the inter-
views at company A. Both the interviewee from the intelligence team and from 
management described behaviors and attitudes that supported the team’s ac-
tions and goals. Most importantly, the actions of the company’s CEO and their 
influence on the intelligence team’s operations were brought up several times in 
the interview with the representative of the team. Firstly, the interviewee from 
the team stated that their CEO “strongly supports the idea that we must have a 
team that produces information” and she described him as a person who “wants 
decisions backed up with information” and who “insists others to ground their 
decisions in facts”. Secondly, the interviewee explained how the CEO’s influ-
ence showed in “the fact that our team is arranged like this in the first place” 
and how he wants that “everything the company does is to fulfill consumer 
needs”. 
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The decision making culture endorsed by the CEO resonated in a remark made 
by the interviewee from management. The manager’s remark demonstrates 
how the organizational culture has the team’s purpose embedded in the com-
pany’s values and how the team’s outputs are appreciated: 
 
“…the bigger the projects, the more we deploy them [the team]. Our growth 
strategy, for example, that’s going on right now, the team is deeply involved be-
cause we want to make sure that the conclusions we make are supported by 
facts.” 
 
The interview with the representative of the intelligence team highlights the role 
the CEO at company A has had in establishing the team, in implanting a culture 
where decisions are grounded in facts and where there is a focus of “fulfilling 
customer needs”. These findings indicate that the CEO has simultaneously initi-
ated a culture where decisions are justified by fact, and established a team with 
the objective of serving this principle by scanning the market and collecting da-
ta. In addition, the interviewee from the intelligence team made an observation 
suggesting that behaviors in the organization had changed into the team’s fa-
vor: 
 
”We’ve been handling so much information now and you notice that reactions 
are not that ‘oh this is so new and frightening and strange’, and that people are 
not that baffled at all now that we’ve established a practice where information is 
utilized. It’s now considered continuously, and it’s been really important that 
when management makes decisions they must have reasons that are support-
ed by fact.” 
 
The CEO’s importance as an organizational player in company A highlights the 
role that senior management has in supporting intelligence teams. Effectively, 
the CEO at company A was a player who changed attention structures – the 
inception of the team and the promotion of a certain culture in decision making 
– in such a way that worked to the intelligence team’s advantage. It is also 
noteworthy how the interviewee from the intelligence team had observed a 
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change in behavior in the organization and described how others were no long-
er “baffled” about having information incorporated in their activities. 
 
The examples above highlight the role a CEO can have, but the interviews with 
the intelligence teams at both companies suggest that the teams also take 
measures in endorsing a culture that utilizes information in decision making. 
Specifically, the interviewee from the intelligence team at company B spoke of a 
culture of “leading with information” several times. She explained that one of the 
team’s objectives was to promote a culture where “information is incorporated 
into decision making” and that “everyone would ask themselves what infor-
mation they need and what our company needs in order to compete”. However, 
the interviews at company B didn’t reveal any direct evidence of a supportive 
culture similar to that observed at company A. 
 
4.2.2 Integrating the teams into activities and procedures 
The intelligence teams at company A and B were engaged in two kinds of tasks. 
The teams would conduct regular analyses where they would, for example, 
make standardized “measurements” concerning market shares or macroeco-
nomic indicators, and these tasks were carried out in periodic routines. Howev-
er, the teams’ roles in organizational activities were most prominent in the sec-
ond kind of tasks where they assisted other organizational members through 
specialized inquiries. The team at company A had a specific importance in 
providing “insights” for the company’s product development process and the 
team at company B would assist in “finding growth” by identifying prospective 
new customers and by helping managers to make sense of markets. 
 
The interviewee from the intelligence team at company A stated that the pur-
pose of the team was to be “the voice of the consumer”. Much of the team’s 
efforts were directed to understanding their customers and to monitoring their 
competitors’ moves. The interviewee elaborated on this matter: “we are the 
team that tells our company what consumers want, but another important task is 
to monitor the market and how our main competitor is doing”. Furthermore, the 
team had a special emphasis in helping the development of new products that 
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would compete better in the market. The interviewee from the intelligence team 
explained this idea: 
 
”Our management wants that products introduced to the market are backed by 
a consumer need, and we’re the ones producing that knowledge, which is then 
used as a basis in product development by our product management.” 
 
The interviewee from management from company A represented product man-
agement and explained his view on how the team would be utilized in the prod-
uct development process. The team would analyze markets and consumers for 
their product development needs: 
 
“It’s really project-specific, some projects, where we introduce new products, for 
example, it can be that we have the idea that we could introduce a new product 
in a certain product category. Then I ask them [the team] what information they 
have about this category, what are the trends there, and then I apply what they 
are able to provide me in my own thinking.” 
 
The same manager at company A did, however, mention how he can lack the 
“time and ability” to conduct “comprehensive research and analysis” and further 
commented on the influence of the team’s work and on the value of the conclu-
sions the team makes. The manager was asked how he reacts if the team has 
some kind of idea to offer him, and in his reply we can see how the team can go 
so far as to interpret the environment and suggest actions accordingly: 
 
“I think it’s great how the team goes through numerous information sources, and 
then they come to us and tell us that, for instance, consumption in one of our 
product areas has decreased and they explain the reasons why that has hap-
pened and tell us if we want to achieve growth there again, this is what we 
should do, based on certain facts of the market. And then I think, well, that’s 
what we will do, because I know the ideas will go forward in our organization 
and no one will question them since they are based on actual knowledge.” 
 
50 
 
These findings suggest that the activities and procedures that intelligence 
teams take part in allow the teams to promote issues and answers and to draw 
other organizational members’ attention to them. Furthermore, participation in 
these activities enables the teams to demonstrate their capabilities and to solidi-
fy themselves as legitimate organizational players. This is evident in the exam-
ple above, where the manager judged that the idea presented by the team 
would “go forward in our organization” because it was “based on actual 
knowledge”. The same manager also described how the explanations the team 
found for the declining consumption of their products provided “something to 
lean on” in future product development and how they were “on to something 
good, because them team’s analysis shows there’s a large amount of consum-
ers behind this trend”. 
 
These findings also highlight how the intelligence team was considered a credi-
ble source of advice and judgement. Furthermore, the team at company A dis-
played initiative in this respect. The interviewee from the intelligence team ex-
plained how managers would make requests for “ad hoc” analyses and how the 
team would assist managers in the search for information: 
 
”Sometimes what happens is that they ask, for example, how our sales have 
developed in a certain area, and then what I ask in return is what do you need 
this for, because often I realize that given the situation it would be better to look 
at a broader perspective or from a different point of view for them to get the in-
formation they actually wanted.” 
 
One of the main concerns of the intelligence team at company B was to assess 
market outlooks and the competitive landscape in periodic reports disseminated 
through an information management system. The interviewee described the 
discussions they have with managers in determining the content of these re-
ports and how they would carry out such discussions on a regular basis. Here, 
we can see how the team at company B displays initiative similar to that at 
company A in assisting managers with their information needs: 
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”We always have a round of meetings with the representatives of business are-
as every autumn, and based on that round we form a service description. From 
their point of view, it’s kind of a shopping list, so to speak, where we describe 
the reports we’ll be making and when they will be issued, and what internal and 
external information sources we use... ...quite often I’ll have preliminary sugges-
tions that will get us forward, and typically we will be going through them and 
after discussing for a while, they’ll start bringing in their own comments and 
viewpoints; ‘oh yes, I’ll be needing this and that at that point of time’.” 
 
However, the interview data suggests that the role of the team at company B 
was best demonstrated in tasks where they would help the company make 
sense of the environment and grow the business. The interviewee representing 
management at company B specified how they make use of three information 
sources: the reports and other work produced by the intelligence team, their 
sales organization’s personal reports and the company’s bookkeeping data. 
These information sources were utilized in developing the business and in “find-
ing growth" through various growth projects and here the three sources were 
combined to “develop something sensible”. The intelligence team conducted 
specific inquiries where they would, for example, provide market data, report on 
competitors or compile lists of prospective new customers. When asked how 
the organization makes use of their work and how that shows from their point of 
view, the interviewee from the intelligence team replied: 
 
“The best examples are where we have done analysis on our customers or 
identified potential new customers and then we hear that our sales organization 
has been in contact with them and the backup material we’ve provided has 
been useful, that’s the best feedback there is; we’ve supported sales in acquir-
ing new customers. Or if we have made a certain assessment of the growth of a 
certain market and then we have our business’s strategy or certain operative 
measures based on that assessment.” 
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4.2.3 Reservation and opposition towards the teams’ views 
The interviews at both companies revealed that the sentiment towards the data 
and conclusions provided by the intelligence teams can be dismissive or even 
negative and that an immediate acceptance of information as fact cannot be 
expected. These considerations indicate clashes between the intelligence 
teams and individuals who override the teams’ views. Other organizational 
members can, for example, question the reliability of the data that the teams 
provide or dispute the meaning of it. The representative from the intelligence 
team at company A commented on the objections they face from time to time: 
 
”It’s possible that some things are questioned, for example, is our sample of a 
survey sufficient and can we trust it, we have these kind of discussions some-
times. We do have an information source of our consumer market, and it’s a big 
one, a consumer poll, but occasionally people question it and say something 
along the lines ‘that’s just that information again’, sometimes people react that 
way…” 
 
Similarly, the interview with the manager at company B revealed a reservation 
towards the legitimacy of the intelligence team’s data sources. The interviewee 
exhibited a sense of caution towards the figures provided by external data 
sources and delivered by the team. The manager raised concern about the 
credibility and reliability of the data: 
 
”... it’s about the extent to which we can rely on a figure extracted from a data 
source for example, there’s someone who has compiled and added up all that 
data, and it’s possible there can be mistakes, and we’ll have to think is it really 
the case what it says. So, for example, if it’s said that deliveries of a certain kind 
of product to a certain area have increased by five percent over the past six 
months, we’ll then think is that really the case, or have they made a miscalcula-
tion… …they are complicated to measure and it’s possible there’s mistakes, it’s 
unavoidable, the research center that does them has to make estimations and 
of course there can be mistakes.” 
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While the examples above mainly deal with other organizational members ques-
tioning the credibility of the teams’ data, the interviewee from management at 
company A brought up an incidence where an organizational member displayed 
adamant opposition towards the meaning of information that, in the interview-
ee’s view, should be considered as a certain fact. In this case, the opposition 
was not about disputing the reliability of data, but about overriding the meaning 
of it.  
 
”You also have cases where someone higher up in the organization comes and 
smashes his fist to the table and says ‘this is how it is’, and then you can forget 
about informed decisions based on facts, it’s useless at that point, because 
someone just comes and says how things are… …it has been, for instance, that 
it’s been shown that a market is declining, it’s been confirmed that it does. Then 
someone steps in and says ‘it’s not declining’ [the person would argue]. Well, as 
a matter of fact, it is declining, just look at this and this! ‘It’s not declining, people 
are consuming here and there’ [the person would continue]. What’s that based 
on then?” 
 
The incidence above where a person from “higher up in the organization” dis-
played denial of a declining market was an extreme example of the opposition 
that intelligence teams can face in organizations. It appeared to be difficult for 
the interviewee to understand the person’s behavior, but it might be reasonable 
to suspect that the person refuted the news of a declining market while not yet 
knowing how to deal with the fact and decided to give an appearance of self-
confidence in an attempt to keep spirits up in front of depressing outlooks. It is, 
therefore, conceivable that the person’s behavior was explained by an unwill-
ingness to accept the fact publicly. 
 
One should acknowledge, however, that it is not necessarily straightforward to 
explicate the meaning of new information and to determine how that information 
will affect the future plans of the organization. Regardless, it is difficult to see 
how contradicting commonly shared data with a counterargument of virtually no 
substance would do anything else than result in a sense of confusion and dis-
courage other organizational members from paying further attention to the data. 
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This example highlights how the values and behavior of individual players can 
act against intelligence teams’ goals. 
 
The interview data indicates that intelligence teams’ might have to compete for 
management’s attention with other sources of judgement in the organization. 
The interview with the representative from management at company B suggests 
that he faced a challenge of balancing between two contrasting information 
sources: the sales organization’s own accounts of conducting their business, 
and the data and viewpoints delivered by the intelligence team. The interviewee 
explained that his main objective from a managerial point of view was to under-
stand markets and customers and to identify areas of growth opportunities. He 
emphasized the sales function’s conception of their customers and “the tacit 
knowledge you can’t quantify in any way” and how these aspects contributed to 
the effort. He touched these issues in the following remarks: 
 
”Generally the sales people who work in the business have the best grip of it, 
it’s based in their experience, some of them have been in the business and the 
market for 25 years, that’s one way to approach it, and then another one is to 
challenge it through market data, and we try to fit these two together to figure 
out what’s true… …but someone who’s been in the business for twenty years, 
somehow just knows when things are not going right, we take it seriously and 
then we try to assess whether it’s resistance to change or if it’s something justi-
fied.” 
 
When asked what happens if the two – the view of the sales organization and 
the market data – are in disagreement, he commented that when confronted 
with negative news, the probable reaction in the sales organization is refusal 
and disbelief. However, the interviewee reported that in such instances they 
would make their way forward by going through the issues together and that 
over time a “sensible approach in everyone” would likely be reached. The inter-
viewee commented on this matter: 
 
“Of course there’s a phenomenon where salesmen tend to be conservative, and 
believe in the business they’re in. When they’re told that what they’ve been do-
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ing is slowly dying away and we’ve got this other thing coming up instead, they’ll 
probably say ‘that’s not true’. It’s an emotional reaction. And there’s no standard 
formula, we specifically look into every situation and think what to do about it, 
there’s not that many of us here and we know each other well. But what I want 
to say is that, these intelligence figures, we can be slightly cautious about them, 
we are well aware there can be mistakes in them.” 
 
In the two testimonies above, we can see that there was a question of what is 
more meaningful from a managerial point of view at company B, the data gen-
erated by the sales organization and manifested in reports of personal ac-
counts, or the views of the intelligence team and market data, and which of the 
two makes a more convincing argument. These findings also indicate that a fac-
tor inhibiting the teams’ progress can be a sense of caution towards the teams 
and their data sources embedded in management’s thinking. Part of the teams’ 
challenge, therefore, can be to overcome such presuppositions and convince 
managers that the views they present are valuable and to consolidate their 
views as a legitimate proxy of reality.  
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5 Discussion 
Daft and Weick’s (1984) model of organizations as interpretation systems pro-
poses a three-stage process where organizations (1) carry out scanning to 
gather data from the external environment, (2) let managers interpret the data to 
determine the implications of the environment for organizational action and (3) 
follow these implications in actions and then learn from the outcomes. Two im-
portant properties of this process are that, firstly, interpretation and action are 
preceded by scanning and that the results of scanning are incorporated in the 
interpretation process, and secondly, that the learning that occurs after organi-
zational action can justify a revision of interpretation if outcomes are observed 
to be different to expectations. 
 
One can, however, question the extent to which current interpretations and ac-
tions are a consequence of actual data collection from the environment. The 
discovery of an urgent problem, for example, might drive a manager to take 
immediate actions based on existing beliefs rather than to commence scanning. 
Moreover, Ocasio’s (1997) views suggest that managers might not conduct 
scanning unless there is something that directs their attention to it, such as a 
specific procedure or the influence of an organizational player. Furthermore, the 
scanning that companies do engage in cannot possibly cover all relevant as-
pects of the environment and managers are not able to fully consider all availa-
ble data in their interpretation processes. Hence, the connection between scan-
ning and interpretation can be of dubious quality and it is possible that the tem-
poral sequence of scanning preceding interpretation and action does not occur 
at all. 
 
The findings of this thesis improve our understanding of the relationship be-
tween scanning and interpretation and describe how intelligence teams operate 
at the interface of the two. Managers might not see any reason to doubt the va-
lidity of their own thinking but an intelligence team operating as an update 
mechanism can (1) discern faulty interpretation, (2) pinpoint managers’ misun-
derstandings and (3) propose an alternative assessment to them and induce 
change in beliefs. Utilizing an intelligence team can, therefore, help ensure that 
interpretation is supported by environmental data and that misconceptions are 
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recognized and interpretations revised before action is taken rather than after. 
This does, however, call for managers to allow others to scrutinize their thinking 
and to incline towards adopting alternative conceptualizations of the environ-
ment. Moreover, previous literature has described how distinct events in the 
environment grasp management’s attention and how management then collabo-
rates to interpret those events (Beck & Plowman, 2009). This thesis, in turn, 
shows how intelligence teams can operate in the background of management 
and can engage in an uninterrupted survey of management’s thinking that 
alarms management whenever misinterpretation does surface. 
 
The procedures and activities the teams take part in are crucial to this undertak-
ing. The teams cannot grasp others’ thinking unless they engage in discussions 
with them and cannot exert influence without the proper opportunities to do so. 
Furthermore, a decision making culture that incorporates environmental data in 
decision making encourages the teams and helps establish them as legitimate 
players. The teams’ main resources are their reasoning powers and the con-
crete data that they apply in justifying their views. However, organizational 
members can be dismissive towards the teams’ work, exhibit reluctance to con-
sider the teams’ views and the corroborating evidence supporting them, and it 
can take time before managers concede that the teams’ views are worthy of 
consideration. As Ford and Baucus (1987, p. 370) put it: “the power to define 
reality is not willingly surrendered”. 
 
Altogether, the second-order themes and aggregate dimensions outlined above 
together form a framework around the teams’ behavior in organizations. Firstly, 
the organizational conditions and context lay the ground for them to operate in. 
Integrating the teams into activities and procedures and a culture supporting 
them are conducive to their actions in identifying unsound beliefs and in facilitat-
ing change in beliefs. The reservation and opposition towards the teams’ views 
does the opposite and is the primary source of resistance to the teams’ efforts 
in facilitating change in beliefs. Figure 8 below illustrates these relationships. 
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Figure 8 Intelligence teams in facilitating change in organizational beliefs 
 
In certain respects, the teams’ behavior bears resemblance to that described by 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008, p. 582), who argue that a subsidiary produces a 
distinct “voice”. In their view, a subsidiary can attract positive attention from a 
corporate headquarters through “initiative taking”, assertive, change-oriented 
behavior and “profile building”, the commitment it displays towards organiza-
tional goals and values and the track record of accomplishments. The teams’ 
efforts in facilitating change in beliefs can be thought as a form of “initiative tak-
ing”, which then contributes to “profile building” once their efforts are recog-
nized. Although the concepts of initiative taking and profile building were initially 
used in a different organizational context, it is useful to apply them here to de-
scribe how intelligence teams are able to improve their position in organizations. 
 
The practical implications of this thesis are twofold. Firstly, it is important for 
managers to recognize that intelligence teams can facilitate change in organiza-
tional beliefs. An organization looking to ensure an accurate perception of the 
external environment can find a solution from an intelligence team, while re-
membering to properly integrate the team into their activities and communica-
tions. It is equally important for managers to pay attention to the culture sur-
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rounding decision making, and a culture where environmental data is appreciat-
ed and where managers are open to alternative considerations of the environ-
ment is likely to encourage the teams in this behavior. Secondly, intelligence 
teams willing to strengthen themselves inside the organization can, in turn, try 
to influence senior management and especially the CEO to endorse a culture or 
procedures that are in favor of them. Furthermore, it can be worthwhile for the 
teams to manage the “voice” they emit and the image they project of them-
selves inside the organization in order to attract positive attention from man-
agement. 
 
This thesis also provides an answer to previous literature, including Stubbart 
(1982), who would have wanted to see environmental scanning units function 
as a counterbalance for managers, who are often consumed in short-run opera-
tional problems, by bringing threats to their attention that would otherwise go 
unnoticed. Referring to a lack of understanding of their businesses and of true 
insight into what is relevant in the external environment, he deemed scanning 
units incapable of reaching this ideal. This is, however, what we can observe 
intelligence teams do now – they are effectively raising important considerations 
to the attention of other organizational members. It is reasonable to think that 
these teams today have better resources and are much more powerful players 
than the scanning units of the early 1980’s, thus weighing more in attention 
structures than during the time when Stubbart reached his conclusion. 
 
Furthermore, Ghoshal and Westney (1991, p. 24) investigated the manner in 
which organizations benefit from competitive intelligence units and described an 
operation called “sensitization”, where the units would “’shake up the troops’ 
through presentations that combined data, interpretations, and conjectures”. 
Ghoshal and Westney (1991, p. 24) provide two examples of how the teams 
operated in this manner: 
 
“Through a powerful series of presentations the CA [competitive analysis] unit of 
the company showed the remarkable progress the competitor had made in its 
product and process technologies, the gradual and carefully planned expansion 
of its share in many key markets, and hence the reality and urgency of the 
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threat it posed to the company's long-term future. Another example from one of 
the other companies was a competitor analysis presentation that addressed the 
perception that a particular competitor was in an extremely vulnerable financial 
position and therefore not a significant competitor, and demonstrated how in 
fact it continued to be a serious threat both in the home market and abroad.” 
 
Their description of the events does show that the intelligence units recognized 
shortcomings in their organizations’ perceptions of their competitors and that 
the units challenged them. However, their analysis of the situations falls short of 
the ultimate impact that these “presentations” had and it is left unclear whether 
these efforts resulted in any concrete change in beliefs or not. The descriptions 
above merely imply that there was a recognized opportunity for the units to in-
fluence beliefs, but it is not shown that the opportunity was effectively capital-
ized. While this thesis discovered similar behavior in intelligence teams, it goes 
further in demonstrating the actual power of this behavior, examines in greater 
detail how the teams are able to induce change in beliefs and builds a concep-
tual framework around the phenomenon. 
 
A significant limitation of this thesis is the small number of interviews that cover 
the cases where the intelligence teams are perceived to operate as update 
mechanisms. Both cases featured only two interviews and the specific occur-
rences where the intelligence teams directed attention and facilitated change in 
the organization were covered only by one representative from each of the 
teams, which raises concern of a lack of depth into the events that took place. 
Moreover, a direct managerial point of view to these two occurrences is lacking 
altogether. The views of the parties whose beliefs the teams sought to change 
could have complemented and further validated the findings and especially, il-
luminated the way they experienced their beliefs being challenged and the 
change process that followed. 
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6 Conclusion 
This thesis explored the role of modern intelligence teams in large, multinational 
corporations and shows evidence that such teams can play a role in dismantling 
outdated organizational beliefs and in rebuilding them on fresh environmental 
data. The significance of this capacity is that it helps the organization maintain 
an accurate perception of the environment and that it contributes to the accura-
cy of organizational interpretation as well. While findings in previous literature 
by Ghoshal and Westney (1991) have suggested that the teams can challenge 
existing beliefs, this thesis demonstrates how they continue to facilitate actual 
change in beliefs. 
 
The propositions of Daft and Weick (1984) suggest that organizations function 
as interpretation systems through a three-stage process of scanning, interpreta-
tion and learning. The reality of organizations is that complete adherence to this 
sequence can be too high a demand. Managers can, for example, be tempted 
to act swiftly on existing beliefs, effectively disregarding scanning from the 
equation. It would be impossible to scan everything, but an intelligence team 
can, however, make sure that scanning is incorporated when it is needed the 
most: when managers display a misunderstanding of the current nature of the 
environment. The action of the teams is analogous to that of a passenger in a 
car who realizes that the driver has not noticed an approaching vehicle and who 
alarms the driver of imminent collision. As in the case of the driver, it can occur 
that other organizational members must take action to re-orient managers’ at-
tention before it is too late. 
 
Further examination of modern intelligence teams and specifically, how their 
efforts shape beliefs in organizations, is a possible avenue of future research. 
The findings outlined in this thesis provide preliminary understanding of the pro-
cesses that regulate beliefs in organizations. However, the main limitation of 
this study was that the parties whose beliefs were challenged by the intelligence 
teams were not interviewed. Their accounts on how they experienced these 
events would have been essential in understanding how beliefs undergo 
change and future research should acknowledge this consideration. 
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Other scholars have stressed the importance of these issues: Tripsas and 
Gavetti (2000, p. 1158) raise the question of “how beliefs evolve within organi-
zations” and Vuori and Huy (2016) state that there is insufficient understanding 
of the processes that would shape managerial beliefs. However, the findings of 
this study only dealt with processes at the lower levels of organizations, and it 
would be particularly important to investigate if such processes reach the level 
of top management. Top management does, after all, exert the greatest influ-
ence and control over organizational action.  
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